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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
 IN BRIEF 
VOLUME 98 OCTOBER 2012 PAGES 48–60 
RESPONSE 
ACCENTUATE THE NORMATIVE: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
MCKENNA 
Jeremy N. Sheff* 
 his article, “A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trade-
mark Law,”1 Professor Mark McKenna makes two significant 
claims. The first is that the dominant Law and Economics theory of 
trademark law—the search-costs theory of the Chicago School—is 
in some way connected to recent undesirable expansions of trade-
mark rights. The second is that a preferable theory of trademark 
law—one that would result in more tightly circumscribed and so-
cially beneficial notions of trademark rights—would take consumer 
decision making, rather than search costs, as its guiding principle. I 
find myself sympathetic to these arguments, and yet I believe they 
are subject to criticism on grounds that they violate Hume’s Law—
that is, they confuse the descriptive with the normative, the is with 
the ought.2 In this response I will suggest that a careful untangling of 
the descriptive and normative elements of McKenna’s project, while 
perhaps undermining some of his claims, lends considerable sup-
port to his overall ambition of organizing trademark doctrine by 
reference to a theory other than search-costs theory.  
                                                                    
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University. 
1 98 Va. L. Rev. 67 (2012). 
2 See 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888) 
(1739) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always re-
mark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reason-
ing . . . when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last conse-
quence.”). 
IN 
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 Take, for example, McKenna’s first major argument—that search-
costs theory is causally connected to undesirable expansions of 
trademark rights. McKenna claims that modern trademark doctrine 
rests on a fallacious syllogism akin to the one that led Ionesco’s logi-
cian to conclude that Socrates was a cat,3 or that might give my 
young son difficulty as he tries to understand the relationship be-
tween the category “rectangles” and the category “squares.” In clas-
sical formal terms, it is the illicit major premise fallacy in the argu-
ment that proceeds as follows: 
1. All A are B. 
2. All A are C. 
3. Therefore all B are C.4 
In McKenna’s telling, our thinking about trademark law relies on a 
fallacious argument of equivalent form: 
1. All consumer deception raises search costs. 
2. All consumer deception is undesirable. 
3. Therefore everything that raises search costs is undesirable. 
McKenna seems to accept both premises of this argument—he 
concedes that consumer deception raises “a certain kind of search 
costs,”5 and much of his article is devoted to defending the principle 
that consumer deception is undesirable.6 But of course, as a matter 
of logical form an argument that attempts to derive the conclusion 
“everything that raises search costs is undesirable” from these two 
premises is invalid.7 Not content to stop here, McKenna further ar-
gues that the conclusion “everything that raises search costs is un-
desirable” is also contradicted by empirical evidence. Specifically, he 
would like to persuade us that not all increases in search costs are 
undesirable, at least not to all people.8 
                                                                    
3 Eugène Ionesco, Rhinocéros 46 (1959).  
4 See Michael F. Goodman, First Logic 73–74 (1993). For the source of this species of 
logical analysis, see generally Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete Works of Aris-
totle: The Revised Oxford Translation, at 39-113 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984).  This form 
of syllogism is what Aristotelian logicians refer to as an AAA-3 argument, which is al-
ways invalid because the major term of the argument is distributed in the conclusion 
but not in the major premise. See Goodman, supra at 73–74. Of course, classical Aristo-
telian logic has been largely supplanted in modern philosophy. See generally John P. 
Burgess, Philosophical Logic (2009). 
5 McKenna, supra note 1, at 71 n.10. 
6 See, e.g., id. at 113. 
7 Goodman, supra note 4, at 4 (defining a valid argument as one for which “it is impos-
sible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false”). 
8 McKenna, supra note 1, at 81–92. 
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This is all fine and good so far as it goes. But the next move in the 
argument invites more scrutiny. McKenna would like to convince us 
that all of the problematic innovations in trademark doctrine over 
the past half-century—innovations that have expanded the scope of 
trademark rights far beyond what is necessary to prevent consumer 
deception—are somehow causally connected to courts’ failure to re-
ject this syllogism, and specifically their equation of search costs 
with confusion.9 In his words: “search costs theory is complicit in 
trademark law’s expansion to the extent it encourages courts to 
equate confusion with search costs and to ignore the relationship 
between search costs and consumer decision making.”10 
I have three objections to this argument. The first is that I am not 
sure what causal mechanism or relationship McKenna intends to 
suggest with the word “complicit.” If it is merely that search-costs 
theory has failed to rein in or roll back the doctrinal developments 
of the past half-century, then we have our first violation of Hume’s 
Law. Such an accusation of complicity is less a descriptive claim 
about a causal relationship than a normative claim about the proper 
scope of trademark rights. A theory’s failure to reverse doctrinal de-
velopments would count in its favor as a descriptive theory of the 
doctrine in question; such failure is only a fault if one thinks the the-
ory ought to generate different doctrine. 
If McKenna’s accusation of complicity is indeed intended as a de-
scriptive claim that search-costs theory somehow generates the doc-
trines of which he complains—perhaps through courts’ alleged 
equation of “search costs” with “confusion”—then we come to my 
second objection. To wit: I don’t believe this claim is consistent with 
the cases McKenna cites in support of it. Of course, I concede that 
the Supreme Court has invoked search-costs theory as a general jus-
tification for legal regulation of trademarks,11 and that Judge Posner 
and his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit rely heavily on search-
costs theory in trademark cases. But tellingly, the most obvious ex-
                                                                    
9 Id. at 92–111. 
10 Id. at 99. 
11 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (cited in McKenna, 
supra note 1, at 76 n.17). I don’t believe McKenna would disagree with the principles 
announced in Qualitex: that color can be protectable as a trademark as a general mat-
ter, but might in particular circumstances provide a non-reputation-related advantage 
that requires it to be available to competitors. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 
48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 847–54 (2011) (discussing competitive need as a principle of aes-
thetic functionality doctrine). 
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ample McKenna cites—Judge Posner’s opinion in Ty v. Perryman—is 
about dilution, not confusion, and moreover demonstrates the fun-
damental silliness of attempting to retroactively justify many mod-
ern trademark doctrines in terms of search costs, when their pur-
poses and effects clearly lie elsewhere.12 
Moreover, many of the confusion-based decisions McKenna ob-
jects to are not informed by search-costs theory in any obvious way. 
Take, for example, the sponsorship and affiliation confusion cases 
that McKenna knows all too well.13 Not one of the cases he discusses 
in the section of his article dedicated to critiquing this doctrine says 
anything about search costs.14 On initial-interest confusion, McKen-
na essentially concedes that misappropriation theory, not search-
costs theory, is driving the expansion of trademark rights.15 On post-
sale confusion, again, it is not search-costs theory that McKenna ob-
jects to, but the fact that courts are “always able to fall back in these 
cases on broad references to the problem of consumer confusion.”16 
If the judges in these cases are being led astray by search-costs the-
ory, they are leaving no evidence of it in the text of their opinions. 
Thus, McKenna seems to be relying on a fallacy of his own when 
he argues that search-costs theory is somehow generating an unde-
sirable expansion in trademark rights: the straw man. McKenna 
claims that courts’ reasoning can be encapsulated in three related 
propositions: (1) Courts “take it as a given that confusion necessari-
ly harms consumers[, because] (2) [c]onfusion increases search 
costs, and (3) search costs are bad. End of story.”17 But propositions 
2 and 3 do not seem to be playing any significant role in the expan-
sion of doctrine McKenna decries. Rather, all the work appears to be 
done by proposition 1: the proposition that confusion harms con-
sumers. 
                                                                    
12 Compare Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), with Rebecca Tushnet, 
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 
(2008). 
13 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 Stan. L. 
Rev. 413, 413 (2010). 
14 See McKenna, supra note 1, at 94–99 & nn.76–90 and sources cited therein. 
15 Id. at 99–102. Tellingly, one of the leading initial-interest confusion cases does dis-
cuss search costs as a general justification of trademark law, but this justification con-
spicuously disappears when the initial-interest theory is under consideration, in favor 
of garden-variety misappropriation arguments. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. 
West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048, 1053, 1062–65 (9th Cir. 1999). 
16 McKenna, supra note 1, at 105 (emphasis added). 
17 Id. at 97 (numbering added). 
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If this proposition is the fundamental flaw in modern trademark 
doctrine, it is difficult to attribute it to the Chicago School. Likeli-
hood of confusion has been the standard of federal trademark in-
fringement since well before the Law and Economics movement 
found its legs, let alone trained its sights on trademark law.18 To the 
contrary, McKenna, like myself and many other trademark commen-
tators, has invoked principles of welfare economics from which 
search-costs theory is derived to critique recent expansions of 
trademark rights as theoretically unsound.19 We would not be able 
to make such arguments if trademark doctrine was consistent with 
those principles. Thus, I think McKenna’s descriptive claim that 
search-costs theory is somehow causally linked to an undesirable 
expansion in trademark rights is unpersuasive.20 
This is not, I think, as serious a fault as it might seem for McKen-
na’s project, because of my third objection to his argument about the 
causal relationship between search-costs theory and expansive 
trademark rights: it is irrelevant. Even if I’m correct that McKenna’s 
descriptive claim fails to persuade, this does not settle the normative 
question whether reducing consumer search costs ought to be the 
goal of trademark law. On that normative question, I think McKenna 
has the better of the argument. The empirical evidence he reviews 
provides strong support for his normative claim that lowering 
search costs ought not to be our organizing principle in trademark 
cases. This is simply another way of saying that the conclusion of the 
flawed syllogism I noted at the outset is false. Search-costs theory 
need not be responsible for the expansion of trademark rights for us 
to conclude that those rights are overbroad. And McKenna has given 
us ample independent evidence of such overbreadth. So I view his 
claim that courts equate search costs with confusion, while not en-
tirely correct as a descriptive matter, as superfluous to the normative 
thrust of his project—his defense of a model of trademark law based 
                                                                    
18 See id. at 75 & n.17; compare Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437–38 (1946), 
with Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 29–30 (8th ed. 2011) (dating the or-
igins of the Law and Economics movement to approximately 1960); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265 
(1987). 
19 See generally, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 13 at 414–15; Mark P. McKenna, 
Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (2009). 
20 Interestingly, this implies that the descriptive claims of the Chicago School—that 
trademark doctrine has in fact been developed by courts to minimize search costs—is 
similarly unpersuasive, at least with respect to the more recent doctrinal innovations 
McKenna discusses. 
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on consumer decision making—which I find appealing independent 
of any comparison to search-costs theory. But this leaves us with 
two important questions that I think have related answers. The first 
is a descriptive question: what is driving the expansion of trademark 
rights, if not search-costs theory? And the second is a normative 
question: what ought trademark law be trying to do (if not lower 
search costs) and why? 
On the first question, McKenna’s article suggests some possible 
culprits. One is the misappropriation theory that he recognizes is 
behind initial-interest confusion doctrine and which has been the 
target of some (well-earned, in my view) derision in trademark law 
scholarship.21 But a more intriguing possibility is suggested by 
McKenna’s assertion that courts treat search costs and confusion in-
terchangeably. This claim appears to be the basis of his argument 
for a causal link between search-costs theory and the expansion of 
trademark rights.22 But if I’m correct that search-costs theory is not 
playing a role in the cases in which courts expand trademark 
rights,23 then McKenna’s assertion suggests a far deeper problem. 
That is, I think his complaint is directed not against search-costs 
theory, but against the likelihood of confusion standard for in-
fringement itself. 
McKenna’s own historical scholarship clearly demonstrates that 
trademark liability was not always directed at consumer confu-
sion—to the contrary, historically it was directed at fraud that re-
sulted in diversion of trade.24 The Trademark Act of 1905, for exam-
ple, made likelihood of confusion a barrier to registration, but 
provided a much narrower definition of actionable infringement.25 
Not until the 1920 Act does something approaching confusion enter 
                                                                    
21 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. 
McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137 (2010); see also Robert G. Bone, 
Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. 
Rev. 547, 592–618 (2006); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814–17 (1935); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Ge-
nericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 
398–99 (1990). 
22 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. 
23 See supra notes 11–20. 
24 See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1841 (2007). 
25 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84 §§ 5 & 16, 33 Stat. 724, 725–26 & 728. 
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the statutory language defining a federal unfair competition claim,26 
and only with the 1946 passage of the Lanham Act does likelihood of 
confusion become central to trademark infringement liability.27 It is 
the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act that expand the range of 
actionable confusion beyond confusion of “purchasers”—a devel-
opment that commentators (including McKenna himself) have tied 
to many of the doctrinal innovations he discusses.28 
McKenna seems to suggest that a causal relationship between 
search-costs theory and expanding trademark rights is implied by 
the fact that both arise around the same time,29 but clearly these 
statutory changes also line up with the expansionary trend in the 
cases. So it seems to me that the historical record suggests at least as 
strong a case for a causal relationship between the likelihood of con-
fusion standard and the expansion of trademark rights (though we 
might question which way the causation runs). In fact, I would sug-
gest that this causal relationship is even more plausible than 
McKenna’s claimed link between search-costs and expanding rights, 
insofar as the expansionary cases uniformly cite the likelihood of 
confusion standard of the Lanham Act, but rarely discuss search 
costs at all. 
What, then, might be the causal mechanism through which the 
likelihood of confusion standard and the expansion of trademark 
rights could be related? I think McKenna’s article suggests a highly 
plausible explanation: “confusion” is an extremely broad term that 
can encompass any number of mental states.30 Thus, as likelihood of 
confusion came to replace more tightly circumscribed statutory 
tests for infringement, the scope of trademark rights might well be 
expected to expand to include those mental states (or vice versa, 
perhaps). I believe that this insight is implicit in McKenna’s discus-
sion of the development of trademark doctrine. But here again we 
                                                                    
26 Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-163 § 3, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (creating a private right 
of action for false designation of origin and including “intent to deceive” as an element 
of such a claim). 
27 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489 §§ 32, 43, 60 Stat. 427, 437, 441 (1946). See also 4 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§ 24:1-6 (outlining historical 
development of the modern likelihood of confusion test). 
28 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772 § 14, 76 Stat. 769, 771, 775; see also McKenna, 
supra note 24, at 1904–05, 1905 n.282; Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: 
Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 160–61 (2005); 
Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 776–77 (2012). 
29 McKenna, supra note 1, at 79. 
30 Id. at 92–94. 
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run into Hume’s Law. McKenna’s closing argument on this point 
runs a descriptive claim as to what the likelihood of confusion test 
does together with a normative claim about the appropriate targets 
of trademark law: “it is obvious on a moment’s reflection,” he claims, 
“that trademark law cannot, and should not, respond to all forms of 
confusion or even to all confusion in the marketplace.”31 It is worth 
teasing these two claims apart. 
I don’t agree that trademark law cannot, as a descriptive matter, 
respond to all forms of confusion in the marketplace resulting from 
unauthorized use of a trademark. Indeed, many of the doctrines 
McKenna criticizes strike me as examples of judges attempting to do 
precisely that in service to the Lanham Act’s broad command. I ar-
gued above that this statutory breadth, rather than reliance on 
search-costs theory, is probably what accounts for the expansion in 
trademark rights documented in the first half of McKenna’s article. 
But if I’m correct, my descriptive claim makes McKenna’s second 
claim—his normative claim—all the more important. If the term 
“confusion” is as broad as it appears to be, then the “likelihood of 
confusion” test for infringement becomes something of an empty 
vessel that can be filled with any number of normative claims re-
garding the appropriate scope of trademark rights, any one of which 
might be highly contestable. When such contestable claims end up 
embodied in positive law, we may well have cause to complain 
about the result, but it is incumbent on us to explain through norma-
tive argument what makes the result undesirable. Even if the likeli-
hood of confusion standard, as applied by the courts, could eliminate 
all forms of consumer confusion from the marketplace, the question 
remains whether we would want it to do so. 
McKenna claims the answer to this question must be no, and part 
of his support for this claim is his empirical evidence on the psycho-
logical and welfare effects of search costs. But it seems to me that 
this evidence, standing alone, can at best rule out reduction of 
search costs as a comprehensive normative goal for trademark law. 
While this is not an insignificant achievement, and stands as a major 
contribution of McKenna’s article, it is not the same thing as an af-
firmative normative account of trademark law, which is what I think 
McKenna hopes to provide. Thus, we return to the second question I 
                                                                    
31 Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
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identified earlier: what ought trademark law be trying to do, and 
why? 
McKenna’s answer to this question takes up the second half of his 
article, and can be summarized in the simple directive: “prevent de-
ception that influences consumer purchasing decisions.” His reasons 
in support of this position are bound up in a particular theory of 
consumer autonomy, one which holds that consumers are the best 
judges of their own preferences,32 that they are entitled to deter-
mine and pursue those preferences without interference by oth-
ers,33 and that they need not (or perhaps ought not) be protected 
from others’ efforts to shape those preferences in the absence of de-
ception.34 This vision of consumer autonomy strikes me as the main 
contribution of McKenna’s article, and it bears unpacking. 
I am interested in identifying the source of the normative content 
that informs McKenna’s proposal, because I believe that here as well 
there is an is/ought problem buried beneath the surface. Ostensibly, 
McKenna derives his model of consumer autonomy from false ad-
vertising law and commercial speech doctrine.35 But while the ar-
gument from authority is not necessarily fallacious in the common-
law system, it provides no normative content of its own. The cases 
McKenna cites suggest that normative values inherent in the First 
Amendment underlie his model of autonomy,36 but his own analysis 
is remarkably quiet as to what those values are. 
One possible normative value is improving outcomes: perhaps 
McKenna’s model of consumer autonomy will lead to the best re-
sults as measured by some relevant standard. Recall that McKenna’s 
argument for rejecting search-costs theory as a foundation for 
trademark law rests on his descriptive claim that not all reductions 
in search costs increase consumer welfare. A concern over consum-
er welfare is shot through his critique of search-costs theory,37 and 
it implies a normative criterion for evaluating that theory and the 
doctrine it purports to justify. This criterion is that increases in ag-
gregate welfare are desirable, and decreases in aggregate welfare 
are undesirable—the welfare-maximization principle at the heart of 
the economic analysis of law. 
                                                                    
32 Id. at 73, 122. 
33 Id. at 72, 112–13, 124–25. 
34 Id. at 122–24. 
35 Id. at 120–24. 
36 See id. and sources cited therein. 
37 Id. at 86–90, 141. 
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I do not believe that McKenna’s model of consumer autonomy is 
entirely consistent with this normative principle, which creates an 
odd disconnect between the descriptive project of the first half of 
his article and the normative project of the second half. If McKenna’s 
problem with search-costs theory is that it generates doctrine that 
leads to decreases in consumer welfare, one would expect his alter-
native normative framework to avoid this failing. But it seems to me 
that his theory does not require all decreases in consumer welfare 
that result from trademark-related practices be avoided. And im-
portantly, it is not clear to me whether McKenna’s reason for toler-
ating decreases in consumer welfare is grounded in a descriptive 
claim that the alternative to such toleration invites an even larger 
decrease in aggregate social welfare or a normative claim that values 
distinct from and incommensurate with consumer welfare—First 
Amendment values, perhaps—must take precedence. 
Take McKenna’s discussion of the distinction between deception 
and persuasion—a distinction on which some of his proposals for 
doctrinal reform rest.38 One the one hand, he suggests that the ad-
ministrative costs of attempting to regulate persuasion are too 
high—that it would be impracticable and “messy” to do so, and er-
ror in the attempt could lead to reduction in the availability of so-
cially valuable information.39 This is a descriptive claim: the welfare 
losses that result from consumer susceptibility to persuasive mes-
sages are less than the welfare losses that would result from at-
tempting to regulate such messages. On the other hand, McKenna 
suggests that attempts to regulate persuasive messaging are unde-
sirable regardless of their effect on consumer welfare: “due regard 
for consumer autonomy requires us to live with [consumers’] deci-
sions even if they are bad.”40 This is a normative argument, and it 
cannot be supported by reference to calculations of consumer wel-
fare. To the contrary, it implies that even if regulation of persuasive 
messages would increase aggregate welfare, we should still refrain 
from such regulation. 
I don’t think either of these arguments is flawed in principle, but I 
would like to know which one McKenna would like us to rely on in 
evaluating his proposals. The main reason for my curiosity is that 
the descriptive argument is subject to empirical testing and (poten-
                                                                    
38 Id. at 122–24, 128–31, 133–36. 
39 Id. at 117–18. 
40 Id. at 120. 
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tially) falsification, while the normative argument is not. This sug-
gests a potential for conflicts between the two arguments, which 
would require us to decide which of them carries more weight. 
I think the clearest example of such conflict lies in the potential 
for paternalist intervention that increases aggregate welfare. 
McKenna uses the term “paternalist” as a broadside, invoking all the 
most pejorative connotations of the term.41 “[T]rademark law,” he 
insists, “should not coddle consumers.”42 But of course there is a 
lively debate across a number of disciplines (including law) as to 
whether, and under what circumstances, paternalist intervention 
might be permissible or even desirable.43 
For example, I have written in the past that trademarks supported 
by advertising can bias consumers.44 That is, marketing practices 
can lead consumers to hold beliefs about the objective qualities of 
products that are both false and resistant to correction by exposure 
to empirical evidence, without making claims about such objective 
qualities. I think that McKenna would agree that a consumer whose 
purchasing decisions are biased in the sense I have described is like-
ly to make decisions that lead to lower aggregate welfare than 
would be the case in the absence of the biasing marketing practice. 
What I don’t know is whether McKenna would countenance regula-
tion to curb such biasing marketing practices. 
Another conflict arises in the case of unauthorized uses of trade-
marks on goods of equivalent quality to the plaintiff’s goods. Sup-
pose a defendant applied a plaintiff’s trademark without authoriza-
tion to a product that was in every measurable way precisely 
identical to the plaintiff’s products, but was offered by the defendant 
at a lower price. A consumer who purchased the defendant’s goods 
in reliance on the trademark would be deceived in a way that affect-
ed their decision to purchase, but would be better off for that pur-
chase than she would have been in the absence of the deception. As I 
discuss in forthcoming work, extant doctrine suggests that such a 
                                                                    
41 Id. at 81, 120, 129. 
42 Id. at 138. 
43 Space does not permit me to review this debate here; it is a debate I discuss in Jere-
my N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2021394. 
44 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1245 (2011). 
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defendant’s conduct would constitute trademark infringement,45 
even though this result clearly causes a reduction in aggregate wel-
fare, at least as a matter of first-order effects. Again, it is not clear to 
me whether McKenna’s model would endorse or reject that result. 
These two examples are obviously outside the scope of McKen-
na’s article, but they reveal the tension at the heart of his project. In 
the first case, legal intervention might prevent a decrease in con-
sumer welfare attributable to non-deceptive, non-persuasive uses of 
trademarks by their owners. In the second, legal intervention causes 
a decrease in consumer welfare in preventing a deception that actu-
ally makes consumers better off. To the extent McKenna’s rejection 
of search-costs theory in favor of a consumer decision-making theo-
ry is premised on the welfare effects of search costs, we might con-
clude that a concern for consumer welfare would lead McKenna to 
allow intervention in the first example and to reject it in the second. 
But to the extent McKenna’s embrace of a consumer decision-
making theory is premised on other values that are inherent in a 
particular model of consumer autonomy, we might expect him to re-
ject legal intervention in the first example and endorse it in the se-
cond on grounds that the law ought to leave it to consumers to nego-
tiate the mix of information available in the marketplace even if the 
consequences reduce aggregate welfare.46 
In sum, it is not clear to me whether McKenna’s consumer deci-
sion-making theory is grounded in the normative principles of wel-
fare economics or in some alternative normative principle. If the lat-
ter, it is not clear to me what the alternative normative principle is 
(beyond the ipse dixit that autonomy is a value in itself). There are 
suggestions in his article that such alternative principles might be 
found in the justifications for the First Amendment, and on this issue 
perhaps the work of my co-respondent, Professor Laura Heymann, 
is most instructive.47 But even if this is correct, the argument by 
analogy to First Amendment principles requires us to explore the 
                                                                    
45 Sheff, supra note 43, at 42–47 (citing, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 
461 (2d Cir. 2004); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 
505 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
46 See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 1, at 136–38. Importantly, neither of these examples 
implicates the special cases of non-commercial uses and expressive uses, as to which 
McKenna suggests “external values” might impose limits on trademark liability inde-
pendently of a concern for consumer decision making (or, for that matter, for search 
costs). Id. at 112. 
47 See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First 
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 651, 657 (2009). 
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normative values that underlie those principles, and to evaluate 
their merits against those of the welfare-maximization principle. 
For my part, I think McKenna’s consumer decision-making model 
will be more persuasive if it explicitly disavows welfare maximiza-
tion as the sole—or even the most important—normative value at 
stake in trademark cases. Reliance on welfare maximization reduces 
too many close and contested policy debates to empirical questions 
in which the relevant data is necessarily absent.48 Frequently, we 
must take recourse to some other values that can avoid the empiri-
cal impasse. In some areas trademark law already recognizes such 
values—particularly with respect to expressive uses of trade-
marks.49 An interesting question, then, is whether we can build a 
more complete and coherent model of the values at stake in trade-
mark law. I have some ideas about this,50 and I think they are largely 
consistent with McKenna’s consumer decision-making model. I 
would encourage him to flesh out these hidden foundations of his 
model—to accentuate the normative—in the hopes of escaping the 
is/ought problems that unnecessarily detract from the force of his 
otherwise very appealing claims. 
 
                                                                    
48 See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 44, at 1311–13. 
49 See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 1, at 112. 
50 See generally Sheff, supra note 43. 
